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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
Ecuador also is trying to pass legislation to exclude oil companies from receiving VAT refunds
and has instructed its agents to initiate proceedings to terminate its contractual relationships
with OEPC. 49 The flip side of Ecuador's efforts is that the United States is exerting pressure
upon Ecuador to retreat from its current position in the VAT dispute,5 0 and U.S. financial aid
to Ecuador may be cut from $210 million to $37 million.' Cases such as Occidental are useful,
however, in the sense that they enable states to obtain more information about the scope and
potential interpretation of rights that they may be granting investors. Armed with this extra
information as to how they might inadvertently cede their sovereignty, states can make more
informed decisions about the rights that they grant to investors in the future. By scrutinizing
treaty rights in this manner during treaty negotiations, a state can form more realistic
expectations, thereby preventing post hoc dissatisfaction with awards and also, more generally,
giving states enhanced confidence about the areas in which they can legislate and regulate, and
with what consequences.
Ultimately, Occidental asks more questions than it answers about the rights in investment trea-
ties. It serves as a vital reminder that tribunals should be mindful of the need both to articulate
those considerations that form the ratio decidendi of their awards and to consider with great care
whether to extend an analysis of one case to another case where the facts or the legal context
are substantially dissimilar. Perhaps more importantly, Occidental moves to center stage the ques-
tion of how a state may and may not respond when attempting to address unfavorable awards.
Although investment-treaty arbitration may have been created, in part, to privatize the devel-
opment of international investment law, the hybrid nature of the mechanism and the state of
current jurisprudence suggest that such arbitration is now, for better or worse, part of a larger
foreign relations dialogue.
SUSAN D. FRANCK
University of Nebraska College of Law
Duty to provide diplomatic protection-extraterritorial effect of constitutional rights-intelligence
sharing--death penalty under international law
KAUNDA V. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. Case CCT 23/04. 2004 (10) BCLR
1009, reprinted in 44 ILM 173 (2005), at <http://www.concourt.gov.za>.
Constitutional Court of South Africa, August 4, 2004.
In Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court of South Africa
found that the state's Constitution obligates the government to consider requests for diplomatic
protection from citizens who are facing actions by other states that may violate international law,
and to deal with those requests appropriately. Although the government has wide discretion
in how to respond, its decisions are subject to constitutional control and judicial scrutiny.
Samuel Kaunda and sixty-eight other South Africans were arrested in Zimbabwe. They faced
potential extradition to Equatorial Guinea, where they would be charged with participating in
an attempted coup against that state's government. Fearing that they would be mistreated in
" See Oxy Faces Ecuador Trouble, INT'L OIL DAILY, Aug. 24, 2004, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File;
Juliette Kerr, Petroecuador Files Complaint Against Occidentalfor Breach of Contract, WORLD MARKETrSANALYSIS, Sept.
17, 2004, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
5' Kintto Luca,America's Social Reform: Debate Grows over Trade Tribunal Rulings, IPS-Inter Press Service/Global
Information Network,July 29, 2004, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; Investment Disputes Jeopardize Free
Trade Deal, BUS. NEWS AM., Oct. 7, 2004, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
51 U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ECUADOR: USAID PROGRAM PROFILE, at <http://www.
usaid.gov/locations/latin americacaribbean/country/ecuador/>; see also Gareth Chetwynd, Oxy Rows with Quito,
Upstream, Oct. 1, 2004, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS database.
' Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa (CC Aug. 4, 2004). The South African Constitution and
the judgments of the Constitutional Court are available at <http://www.concourt.gov.za>.
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Zimbabwe and be sent to Equatorial Guinea, where they would face mistreatment, an unfair trial,
and a death sentence, they brought suit in the High Court in Pretoria to compel the South Afri-
can government to take steps to ensure that their rights under the South African Constitution
were not violated. The applicants requested, among other things, that the government submit
weekly reports to the court on the actions taken to secure those rights in Zimbabwe and Equato-
rial Guinea. The High Court denied the application.2
The Constitutional Court allowed a direct appeal. It agreed with the applicants that they had
a cognizable constitutional right, but disagreed with them about both its source and its scope,
and held that the actions of the South African government had not violated that right.
The applicants based their claim on the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights in con-
junction with section 7(2) of the Constitution, which requires the state to "respect, protect, promote
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights." In effect, they argued that the South African gov-
ernment had an obligation "to act at a diplomatic level to ensure that the rights they claim(ed]
under the South African Constitution [were] respected" by Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea.
3
The Court rejected this claim. The rights in the Bill of Rights belong to people in South Africa
and ordinarily have no extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, international law is enshrined in
the South African Constitution.4 Since it would be an infringement of the sovereignty of other
states for South Africa to insist that they act consistently with its Bill of Rights, "section 7(2)
should not be construed as imposing a positive obligation on government to do this." 5
The Court then distinguished its earlier decision in Mohamed.6 In that case, the applicant had
been transferred to the United States as a result of a wrongful act by the South African govern-
ment, which violated his statutory and constitutional rights. The remedy for that violation was
for the government to seek assurances from the United States that Mohamed would not be
subjected to the death penalty.' By contrast, the South African government's only relevant act
in Kaunda was to share information about the applicants' plans with other governments, which
did not violate the applicant's rights. "On the contrary, a failure to pass on the intelligence to
the authorities in Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea would have been a breach of the duties that
South Africa owed to those countries."
The Court then recharacterized the applicants' claim as one for diplomatic protection, which
it defined as "action taken by a State against another State in respect of an injury to the person
or property of a national caused by an internationally wrongful act or omission attributable to
the latter State."9 It acknowledged that current international law recognized a state's right to
exercise diplomatic protection, but not an obligation to its nationals that it do so.'0 Although
the Court noted that some commentators had urged recognizing such a duty where the under-
lying act breached ajus cogens norm, it concluded that "diplomatic protection is not recognised
by international law as a human right and cannot be enforced as such." "
Nevertheless, states can provide such a right as a matter of municipal law. Thus, the Court
turned to the question of whether South Africa does so. The relevant portion of the South
African Constitution is section 3(2)(a), which states that "all citizens are equally entitled to the
rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship." The Court's majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Chaskalson, held that citizens, who will almost always be nationals, are entitled to the
2 Id., paras. 2-5.
3 Id., para. 21.
4 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, sec. 233.
5 Kaunda, para. 44.
6 Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) SALR 893 (CC).
'Kaunda, paras. 44-49.
8 Id., para. 52.
9 Id., para. 26 (citing special rapporteur's First Report [to the International Law Commission] on Diplomatic
Protection, draft Art. 1(1), UN Doc. A/CN.4/506, at 11 (2000)).
'0 Id., para. 23 (citing Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 ICJ REP. 3,
paras. 78-79 (Feb. 5)).
" Id., para. 29.
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privilege or benefit of requesting "the protection of South Africa in a foreign country in case
of need" and of"hav[ing] the request considered and responded to appropriately." 2 The three
other opinions agreed that there is such a right but differed, in part, on its source. 13
All of the opinions acknowledged that actions taken in furtherance of diplomatic protection
involve foreign policy and thus call for a significant degree of deference to the choices made by
the government in response to a request for such protection.
A decision as to whether, and if so, what protections should be given is an aspect of foreign
policy which is essentially the function of the executive. The timing of representations if
they are to be made, the language in which they should be couched, and the sanctions (if
any) which should follow if such representations are rejected are matters with which courts
are ill-equipped to deal. 4
The opinions refer to two leading prior decisions by the courts of other countries interpreting
the scope of a municipal right of diplomatic protection-Hess 15 and Abbasi'"-which each had
stressed executive discretion in finding that the government had done all that was legally required. 7
Nonetheless, the Kaunda Court made clear that there is a role for judicial oversight. The
government must respond appropriately to a request for diplomatic protection," and if the
response was irrational or in bad faith, the court could intervene by requiring the government
to "deal with the matter properly." ' If it was clear that the citizen was subject to a "gross abuse
of international human rights norms," and the government failed to act, the court could order
it to "take appropriate action.,
20
The concurring opinions would also impose both a procedural duty in all cases and a judi-
cially enforceable substantive duty to provide some form of diplomatic protection in the most
compelling cases. Justice Ngcobo saw the state as "obliged to take some steps when an egregious
violation.., is being committed," and Justice O'Regan would impose a duty not "to ignore" the
request for diplomatic protection by "a citizen who is threatened with or has experienced an
egregious violation of human rights norms." In his short concurrence, Justice Sachs-asserting
that all the opinions were compatible-stated that the government has a duty "to do whatever
is reasonably within its power to prevent South Africans abroad... from being subjected to
torture, grossly unfair trials and capital punishment." 21
In applying this approach to the facts, the Court first rejected the applicants' plea that the
government seek to have them extradited back to South Africa. They had not been charged
with a crime in South Africa; even if the decision not to charge them were reviewable, the Court
accepted the government's submission that there was insufficient evidence that they had com-
mitted a crime subject to the South Africa-Zimbabwe extradition treaty.22 Although there was
12 Id., paras. 62-63.
i The opinion of Justice Ngcobo first argued that the Bill of Rights provisions of the South African Consti-
tution, the human rights embodied in treaties to which South Africa is a party, and the general commitment of
South Africa to the values of human dignity, equality, and human rights should inform the Court's answer to the
question of whether there is a duty of diplomatic protection as a needed remedy for these rights. He then found
the textual basis for such a right in the intersection of sections 3(2) and 7(2). Id., paras.173-76, 186-88. The
opinion of Justice O'Regan similarly grounded itself in assertions of South Africa's deep commitment to the
advancement of human rights, but relied, like the majority, only on section 3(2). While that section could be con-
strued as providing only that all citizens are equally entitled to whatever rights, privileges, and benefits the state
provides, O'Regan concluded that the constitutional commitment to the promotion of human rights calls for
finding substantive content in the provision, including a right to diplomatic protection. Id., para. 238.
" Id., para. 77; see also id., paras. 175 (Ngcobo, J.), 244 (O'Regan, J.).
15 BverfGE 55, 349 (1980), available in English translation at 90 ILR 387.
'6 R. v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Af, [2002] All ER (D) 70 (C.A.).
'7 See, e.g., Kaunda, paras. 73-74 (discussion of Hess), 75 (discussion of Abbasi).
I' Id., para. 63.
'9 Id., paras. 79-80.
20 Id., para. 69.
21 Id., paras. 164 & 188 (Ngcobo,J.), 238 (O'Regan,J.), 275 (Sachs,J.). Neither Ngcobo nor O'Regan defined
"egregious."
22 Id., para. 92.
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reason for serious concern about possible human rights violations in Equatorial Guinea,23 the
Court deferred to the government's judgment that it was not required to respond to such con-
cerns while the applicants were still in Zimbabwe, just as it could defer seeking assurances relative
to the death penalty until such time, if any, as they were convicted of a capital crime.24 It specif-
ically rejected the argument that the government had a duty to protect the applicants against
the imposition of the death penalty, since rights under the South African Constitution do not
apply to the acts of other states, and international law does not forbid capital punishment.25
Recognizing that government officials had publicly stated their commitment to providing dip-
lomatic protections, including specific actions already taken in this case,26 the Court pointedly
noted that the ongoing discussions between counsel for the applicants and the government
"will no doubt be conducted in the light of what is said in this judgment." 27
In finding that there is no individual right to diplomatic protection under international law,
the Kaunda Court acknowledged, but rejected, the arguments of certain scholars 28 that such a
right should be found to exist, at least in part, as a needed additional enforcement mechanism
for those international human rights that belong to individuals. It thus refused to further the
call for such a customary international law right as lexferenda.2 9
The Court also distinguished carefully between rights recognized under international law,
as to which states could exercise their right to offer diplomatic protection, and rights that exist
only under municipal law.30 The latter rights do not apply as such to the actions of other states
within their own territory (and thus do not trigger claims for diplomatic protection). 3 Those
rights may, however, bind a state when it acts abroad, so that, for example, the South African
government would be bound to act in conformity with the rights set out in its own Constitution
when dealing with its citizens outside its territory. The scope of such extraterritorial effect is
not entirely clear.32 Furthermore, the duty of a state to protect its citizens' constitutional rights
13 Id., paras. 116-21 (citing reports by Amnesty International, the International Bar Association, and the UN
Commission on Human Rights).
24 In fact, the applicants were all released by Zimbabwe and turned over to South Africa in May 2005. Tawanda
Kanhem, Mercenaries' Release Marks End of an Era, HERALD ONLINE (Zimbabwe) (May 24, 2005), at < http://www.
zimupdates.co.zw/archives/archives.html>. One may assume, though there is no public report, that diplomatic
efforts by the South African government helped achieve this outcome. While most of the applicants were subse-
quently freed, eight are facing charges in South Africa. Eight 'Mercenaries' Face Charges in South Africa, Agence
France-Presse English Wire (June 3, 2005).
25 "Although the abolitionist movement is growing stronger at an international level, capital punishment is
not prohibited by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and is still not impermissible under international law." Kaunda, para. 98.
26
1 Id., para. 142.
27
1 Id., para. 133.
28 See, e.g., Gerhard Erasmus & Lyle Davidson, Do South Africans Have a Right to Diplomatic Protection? 2000 S.
AFR Y.B. INT'L L. 113. The existence of such an obligation by a state toward its citizens had been suggested as
early as Vattel in The Law ofNations, bk. II., ch. VI, §71 (Berry & Rogers 1787) (1758) ("Whoever uses a citizen ill,
indirectly offends the state, which ought to protect this citizen, and his sovereign should revenge the injuries,
punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make entire satisfaction; since otherwise the citizen would
not obtain the great end of the civil association, which is safety.").
29 John Dugard, the distinguished South African jurist, had pressed this position as the International Law
Commission's special rapporteur on diplomatic protection, see First Report on Diplomatic Protection, paras.
28-31, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (2000), but the Commission rejected his proposal, id., para. 87.
" Kaunda, paras. 44 (Chaskalon, C.J.), 214 ((O'Regan,J.). This distinction is implicit in the definition of diplo-
matic protection, see id., para. 26 (Chaskalon, C.J.), as limited to responding to "internationally wrongful act[s]."
"' Id., paras. 41-42, 54-56.
32 Id., paras. 44-45 (Chaskalon, C.J.), 187 ((Ngcobo, J), 228 (O'Regan, J.). As the Kaunda court noted, the
courts of other states have also dealt with the question of when constitutional rights may be claimed in regard to
extraterritorial government action. See, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada'sjudgment in R. v. Cook, [ 1998]
2 SCR 597. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that some constitutional rights do not apply in full extraterri-
torially, see, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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when they are outside its territory is limited by the state's duty to respect the sovereignty of for-
eign states. 3
In terms of substantive human rights law, the Court found that there would be no violation
of international law if another state imposed the death penalty. 4 It also recognized that the
South African government had indicated that its practice, consistent with the affirmative obliga-
tions to promote rights embedded in the South African Constitution, was to make diplomatic
representations as and when necessary relating to the death penalty, and the Court indicated
its expectation that that practice would apply in the case before it.35 These representations relat-
ing to the death penalty would not involve the exercise of diplomatic protection, however, since
they would not be a response to an "internationally wrongful act."
More generally, the opinions embody, in several places, a kind of "jawboning." Although the
Court refused to order the government to do anything more than it was doing, it indicated its
expectations that the government would continue to act consistent with the spirit, as well as the
letter, of the doctrine articulated by the Court.36 Such an approach, particularly in a state com-
mitted to constitutional democracy and the rule of law, can be effective in encouraging the desired
behavior by the government, without requiring the Court to articulate with precision the obli-
gations that it might-at some future time, and as a matter of law-impose upon the government.
The most difficult question raised by the Kaunda opinions is the proper scope of the right
to diplomatic protection. While the opinions acknowledge the deference due the government's
decisions, the overall tenor is one of significant judicial oversight.37 This rule poses a potential
problem where the government concludes that quiet, nonpublic diplomacy would be the most
effective means for securing the requisite protection of its nationals.38 The other state may be
more willing to change course or to correct the actions of a rogue agent if it can do so without
losing face. The expectation that the government must report to a court on what it has done
in response to a request for diplomatic protection, 3 even if the court would almost always find
the government's actions within its margin of appreciation, may have the perverse effect of
rendering diplomatic protection less effective.
The Court seems to be significantly influenced by the arguments of scholars who assume that
there is no cost to requiring the state to give reasons and to justify its decisions in ajudicial forum.'
The earlier decisions of German and British courts on the scope of diplomatic protection, Hess
and Abbasi, were more cognizant of these concerns and provided a narrower right. Hess, recog-
nizing the political context and the need that the state be seen as speaking with a single voice,
concluded thatjudicial intervention is appropriate only if the government's position results "in
the arbitrary treatment of a national which is totally incomprehensible from any reasonable
standpoint including considerations of foreign policy."4 Abbasi noted that prior cases had held
that "courts should act with a high degree of circumspection" and that it "can rarely, if ever,
be for judges to intervene where diplomats fear to tread."42 In considering the situation of Mr.
33 Kaunda, paras. 40, 44 (Chaskalon, C.J.), 229 (O'Regan, J.).
34 See supra note 25.
3
5 Kaunda, para. 99.
36 See, e.g., id., paras. 65, 69, 127, 133, 202.
37The opinions suggest that the need for such oversight is especially pronounced in the context of undefined
"gross" or "egregious" abuses. See id., paras. 70, 163-64, 210, 238, 275.
38 See the list of means of diplomatic protection in Dugard's first report to the International Law Commission,
supra note 29, para. 43 (quoted in Kaunda, para. 27).
" See Kaunda, paras. 79-80, 192-93.
40 Erasmus & Davidson, supra note 28, at 120; Kevin Hopkins, Diplomatic Protection and the South African Consti-
tution: Does a South African Citizen Have an Enforceable Constitutional Claim Against the Government? 16 S. AFR.J. PUB.
L. 387, 394-95 (2001).
"' BverfGE 55, 349 (1980), available in English translation at 90 ILR 387, 398.
42 R. v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Aff., [2002] All ER (D) 70, para. 37 (C.A.) (quoting R. v.
Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Aft. exparte Pirbhai, 107 ILR 462, 479 (C.A. 1985)).
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Abbasi, detained by the United States at Guantinamo Bay, the court refused to intervene, accept-
ing that "if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were to make any statement as to its view of
the legality of the detention of the British prisoners, or any statement as to the nature of the
discussions held with United States officials, this might well undermine those discussions."43
Such circumspection--combined, perhaps, with the availability of an in camera procedure for
reviewing the government's submissions where appropriate-might effectuate the right to have
one's request for diplomatic protection considered without risking prejudice to the effective-
ness of such protection.
MARY COOMBS
University of Miami School of Law
International criminal law-torture-i 984 Convention Against Torture-universal jurisdiction
PROSECUTORV. N. Case No. A07178. At < http://www.rechtspraak.nl >, translated at 51 NETHER-
LANDS INT'L L. REV. 439, 444-49 (2004).
Rotterdam District Court, April 7, 2004.
On April 7, 2004, the Rotterdam District Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) (Court) convicted
Sebastien Nzapali' in Prosecutor v. N 2 for one count of torture committed in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (then Zaire) in 1996. The Court found that the defendant, while serving as
colonel of the Garde Civile in the province of Bas-Zaire, had assaulted and threatened a prisoner
in a manner that amounted to co-perpetration (medeplegen) of torture. The Court acquitted
Nzapali for lack of proof on two additional counts of torture-one concerning another assault
and the other concerning rape. Nzapali received a prison sentence of two-and-a-halfyears, which
was half that which the prosecutor had requested. In determining the length of the punish-
ment, the Court took into account that the defendant had been convicted in his home country
in 1997 for abuse of authority and other relevant crimes. Also, his reputation in the Garde Civile
had earned him the nickname Roi des bites, "king of beasts." According to the Court, these cir-
cumstances "would seem to indicate that the facts that are now proved were not isolated facts."3
Since neither side has appealed, the judgment is final.
The Dutch Torture Convention Implementation Act4 constituted the legal basis of the prose-
cution. That act gave the Dutch courts unqualified universal jurisdiction over acts of torture.
In 2001, however, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) held that this jurisdiction could be
exercised only in cases with a link to the Netherlands, such as the presence of the suspect.' (In
2003, the legislature followed the approach of the Supreme Court and provided universaljuris-
diction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture in a new act concerning
international crimes,6 with jurisdiction dependent upon the presence of the accused in the
13 Id., para. 107.
'[Editor's Note: Though not identified in the Court's decision, the defendant is known to be Sebastien Nzapali,
whose name will be used in this case report. See Marlise Simons, Dutch Court Puts Former Congo Officer on Trial in
Torture Case, NY TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at A13.]
2 Case No. A07178 (Rotterdam Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Judgment], at <http:/www.rechtspraak.nl>.
An official translation, which is the version cited in this case report, can be found in 51 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 439,
444-49 (2004). An unofficial translation is available online at <http:/Avww.trial-ch.org/twdoc/Nzapalijudgement.pdf>.
' Id. at 448.
4 Uitvoeringswet folteringsverdrag [Law for the Implementation of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment], Stb. 1988, No. 478.
5 See In re Bouterse, HR, Sept. 18, 2001, para. 8.5, NJ 559, Eng. trans. at 2001 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 282-96 (2001).
6 As of October 1, 2003, the Wet Internationale Misdrijven [Law Containing Rules Concerning Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law], Stb. 2003, No. 270, replaced both theTorture Convention Implemen-
tation Act, supra note 4, and the Law for the Implementation of the Genocide Convention [Uitvoeringswet
Genocideverdrag], Stb. 1964, No. 243.
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